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RECENT CASES.
BILLS AND NOTES-EXTENSION OF TIME-EvIDENcE-The plaintiff bank
discounted a note and brought action against the second indorser. The de-
fendant claimed to have been discharged by an extension of time through
acceptance of interest from the first indorser after maturity. Evidence ex-
cluded. Held: It was not error to exclude the evidence offered since it did
not appear that the payments were sufficient to have extended the note
beyond its maturity. Bank v. Wester, 242 Pa. 128, 88 Atl. Rep. 9ii (1913).
The general rule is that when, for a consideration, an extension of time
is given to the principal without the consent of the surety, the latter is thereby
discharged. Stevens v. Oaks, 58 Mich. 343, 25 N. W. Rep. 309 (1885); Van
Horn v. Dick, 151 Pa. 341 (1892). But in order to relieve a surety the
agreement for an extension of time must be clear and distinct and upon good
consideration. Bank v. Le Grand, 103 Pa. 3o9, 49 Am. Rep. 126 (1883). Mere
delay, without consideration, is not enough to discharge the surety. McLe-
more v. Powell, 12 Wheat. 554 (1827) ; Schaffstall v. McDaniel, 152 Pa. 598
(1893). But an extension given in consideration of the maker giving another
note discharges the surety. Bishop's Estate, 195 Pa. 85, 2 Atl. Rep. 582 (Ioo).
So also an extenson of time will be inferred where the holder accepts from
the maker a check dated six days after the maturity of the note. Walters v.
Swallow, 6 Whart. 446 (Pa. 1841).
It seems to be well settled that an express extension of time in consid-
eration of interest paid in advance will discharge the surety. Hamilton v.
Winterrowd, 43 Ind. 393 (1873); Hallock v. Yankey, 102 Wis. 41, 78 N. W.
Rep. 156, 72 Am. St. Rep. 861 (1899). But there is a split of authority on the
point whether the mere payment of interest in advance is sufficient evidence
from which a jury may find an extension of time. The affirmative view is
maintained in Bank v. Truesdale, 55 Barb. 6o2 (N. Y. 1884); Siebeneck v.
Bank, III Pa. 187, 2 Atl. Rep. 485 (1886). The negative view is supported
in Bank v. Parsons, 138 Mass. 53 (1884); Bank v. Moorman, 38 Mo. App.
484 (1889). There is also a difference of opinion as to whether a promise to
pay interest at the expiration of an extension of time in consideration for
the promise to extend is binding and so discharges the surety. The affirma-
tive of this proposition is maintained in Dodgson v. Henderson, 113 Ill. 360
(1885) ; McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio, 348 (1846). Contra, Kellogg v.
Olmstead, 25 N. Y. 189 (1862); Campbell v. Daly, 25 Leg. Int. 124 (Pa.
1868); Fanning v. Murphy, 126 Wis. 538, 105 N. W. Rep. 1056, 4 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 666 (igo6).
CONFLICT OF LAWS-ENFOJZCEMENT OF THE PENAL STATUTE OF ANOTHEIt
STATE-Action was brought in a Connecticut court for damages arising from
the death of the plaintiff's intestate, which death resulted from the negligent
and careless operation of the defendant's automobile on the streets of Spring-
field, Massachusetts. The action was brought under a Massachusetts statute,
by construction of which statute the facts set forth in the complaint would
constitute a penal offense in that State. Held: The courts of Connecticut
will not enforce the statutes of another State or country imposing penalties,
nor rights arising thereunder. Christilly v. Warner, 88 Atl. Rep. 711 (Conn.
1913).
The majority of jurisdictions recognize and affirm the general principle
that the courts of one State or country will entertain actions for bodily injury
or death based on the statutes of another State or country, so long as such
action is not contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction where suit is
brought. Knight v. R. R. Co., io8 Pa. 250, 56 Am. Rep. 200 (1883) ; Stewart
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v. R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 42 L. Ed. 537 (1897). It seems that in some
jurisdictions there must be a statute similar to the one under which recovery
is sought. Wooden v. R. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 1o, 13 L. R. A. 458, 26 N. E. Rep.
io5o (18891). And where the local statute is dissimilar no recovery will be
allowed. Slater v. R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 48 L. Ed. goo (19o3). So also
no recovery will be allowed where there is no local statute but the right
claimed is one denied at common law. R. R. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375
(887).
But the rule above stated is subject to the further well-established prin-
ciple that the courts of one State or country will not enforce the penal
statutes of another, as illustrated by our principal case. Marshall v. R. R. Co.,
46 Fed. 269 (i891); Adams, Adm'x, v. R. R. Co., 67 Vt. 76 (1894); Dale v.
R. R. Co., 57 Kans. 6ol, 47 Pac. Rep. 521 (1897). Clearly this is true where
the foreign statute is both penal and dissimilar to the local statute. Mathe-
son v. R. R. Co., 61 Kans. 667, 6o Pac. Rep. 747 (1goo). And even though
there is a local statute similar to the one under which recovery is sought, no
recovery will be allowed. Van Camp v. Aldrich, 5 Ohio Dec. Rep. 92 (1873) ;
especially if the local statute is not penal. O'Reilly v. R. R. Co., 16 R. 1. 388,
5 L. R. A. 364 (1889).
For a general discussion of the above points see 56 L. R. A. 193, note,
and 15 L. R. A. 583, note.
CONTRATs-GAIIING--QuEsTION OF FAcr-A newspaper offered a prize of
an automobile to the baby receiving the greatest number of votes in a baby
parade, votes to be made on coupons appearing in the newspaper. The plain-
tiff subscribed to and paid for fifty copies for one year. Held: It is a question
of fact whether or not the intent of the plaintiff was to enter into a gaming
transaction or a bona fide subscription to the paper. Leonard v. Pennypacker,
89 AtI. Rep. 26 (N. J. 1913).
At the English common law, wagers and bets on almost every subject
were enforcible contracts. Gradually this rule was limited by the courts, and
it was held that no wagers which could be construed as .against public policy
would be enforced. Gilbert v. Sykes, 16 East, I5o (Eng. 1812); Ramboll
Thackoorseydass v. Soojumnull Dhondmull, 8 Moo. P. C. 300 (Eng. 1848).
By statute (8 & 9 Vict, c. IO9), all wagering contracts are declared void, save
only prizes to be awarded to the winner in a sport.
In this country, owing to the Puritan influences of the early settlers, gam-
ing contracts have usually, irrespective of their subject matter, been held
void as against public policy. Irwin v. Williar, iIO U. S. 499 (1883) ; Pritchet
v. Ins. Co. of No. America, 3 Yeates, 458 (Pa. 18o3); Amory v. Gilman, 2
Mass. 1 (18o6).
When the facts give rise to some doubt as to the bona fides of the
transaction, it is usually held, as in the principal case, that the intent of the
contracting parties is a question for the jury. Rankin v. Mitchem, 141 N. C.
277 (i9o6); Thompson v. Reiber, 123 Pa. 457 (1889).
CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY-An automobile dealer agreed to purchase and
accept from a wholesale company twenty automobiles, depositing a sum
of money as part payment, in advance, of $35.00 for each automobile. By
the contract the company was not bound to sell and deliver the automo-
biles, but was given an option whether or not it would deliver any automo-
biles at all. The dealer, after receiving six automobiles under the contract,
changed his plans, notified the company that he would not take the remain-
ing fourteen machines stipulated for and made demand for the unused bal-
ance of his advance deposit. The demand being refused, he brought suit.
Held: The contract was void for want of mutuality, and the plaintiff is
entitled to recover. Goodyear v. H. J. Koehler Sporting Goods Company,
143 N. Y. Supp. 1o46 (1913).
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In executed contracts want of mutuality is no defence to either party.
Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. 504 (1867); Wheeler, Mfg. Co. v. Lyon, 71 Fed.
Rep. 374 (1895). But as a general rule, in executory contracts there must
be mutuality of obligation in order to make a valid and binding contract.
Lester v. Jewett, 12 Barb. 502 (N. Y. 1849) ; Corbett v. Gaslight Co., 6 Ore.
405, 25 Am. Rep. 541 (1876). Otherwise where there is a present considera-
tion. Justice v. Lang, 42 N. Y. 493, i Am. Rep. 576 (187o); Marie v. Garri-
son, 83 N. Y. 14 (188o). Although there is a lack of mutuality in the begin-
ning this may be cured by a subsequent promise or act by the other party.
Morse v. Bellows, 7 N. H. 549, 28 Am. Dec. 372 (1835) ; Goward v. Waters,
98 Mass. 596 (1868); Marie v. Garrison, supra; Johnson v. Staengler, 85
Fed. Rep. 603, 29 C. C. A. 369 (1898). Contra, Amer. Agri. Chem. Co. v.
Kennedy and Crawford, lO3 Va. 171, 48 S. E. Rep. 868 (19o4). And it
seems that part performance is not enough to cure the lack of mutuality.
Gray v. Hinton, 7 Fed. Rep. 8I (1881).
A contract is not void for want of mutuality because one party to it has
an option which the other has not. Disborough v. Neilson, 3 Johns. Cas. 81
(N. Y. 1802); William v. Tiedemann, 6 Mo. App. 269 (1878).
CONTRACT-PENALTY OR LIQUIDATED DAMAGEs-A real estate owner agreed
in writing with the defendant to sell him the same for $2,66o payable by
instalments, the deed to be delivered on full payment. The contract also
contained the stipulation that in the event of a failure to comply with-the
terms, the vendee should forfeit to the vendor all payments that might have
been made on the agreement and the vendor should have the right to imme-
diately take back the property. The vendee having paid $758 failed to pay
the rest and the vendor re-possessing himself of the property sues for dam-
ages on the breach of the contract. Held: The stipulation was one of
liquidated damages and not a penalty, for it was so fairly proportioned to
the damages that might have been sustained on the one hand or the benefits
that might accrue on the other as shown by the fact that the vendor's dam-
ages was $1ooo, which made the actual damage $242. Dopp v. Richards, 135
Pac. Rep. 98 (Utah, 1913).
This decision is in accord with the prevailing rule that where a party
has defaulted in the performance of some contract involving a stipulation
of forfeiture, it will be construed as liquidated damages rather than as a
penalty, unless it can be seen from the evidence that the forfeiture is dis-
proportionate to the breach. Hennessy v. Metzgar, 152 Ill. 505 (1894);
Emack v. Campbell, 14 App. D. C. 186 (1899); Bird v. Church, 154 Ind.
138 (i9oo); Coen & Conway v. Birchard, 124 Iowa, 394 (19o4); Couch v.
Newtown Council Bldg. Ass'n, 96 N. Y. S. 44i (1905); O'Brien v. Anniston
Pipeworks, 93 Ala. 582 (189o); Lincoln v. Little Rock Granite Co., 56 Ark.
405 (1892); Muldoon v. Lynch, 66 Cal. 536 (1885); Eliz. Ry. Co. v. Geoghan,
9 Bush. 56 (Ky. 1872); Hall v. Crowley, 5 Allen, 304 (Mass. 1862); Clements
v. Schuylkill River Co., 132 Pa. 445 (18o).
Where the damages are uncertain in their nature, difficult to ascertain
or impossible to be estimated with certainty by reference to any pecuniary
standard, and where the parties are more intimately acquainted with all the
peculiar circumstances, they are allowed to ascertain and provide in their
agreement the amount of damages which shall be paid. Charleston Fruit Co. v.
Bond, 26 Fed. Rep. 18 (1885); Jaqua v. Headington, 114 Ind. 309 (1888);
Lee v. Overstreet, 44 Ga. 507 (1871) ; Tierman v. Hinman, 16 Ill. 4oo (1855);
St Louis Ry. Co. v. Shoemaker, 27 Kan. 677 (1882); Hahn v. Horstman,
75 Ky. 249 (1876); Jones v. Benford, 74 Me. 439 (1883); Whitfield v. Levy,
35 N. J. L. 149 (1871); Wooster v. Kisch, 26 Hun. 61 (N. Y. 1881); In re
McGeary's Est, 31 Pittsb. Leg. J. 31Y (Pa. 1884) ; Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass.
72 (19oo); Calteck v. Ford, 140 Mich. 48 (ipo5). It is otherwise if the
actual damage can readily and accurately be ascertained, and the courts will
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construe it as a penalty rather than as liquidated damages. Cattle Co. v.
McNamara, T45 Fed. I7 (r9o6); Mansur & Co. v. Tissier Co., 236 Ala. 597
(i9O3); N. & S. Rolling Stock Co. v. O'Hara, 73 Ill. App. 69i (1899);
Merica v. Bengett, 36 Ind. App. 453 (i9O5) ; Taylor v. Landford, 20 U. S.
13 (1882). The importance of the distinction between liquidated damages
and a penalty lies in the fact that if the stipulation is held to be the former
neither party may recover any further on the breach of the contract, while
if it is the latter they may so recover actual damages proved, and the penalty
will not be enforced. See cases supra. For further discussion see 6i U. OF
P. L. REv. 202.
CONTRACTS-SUNDAY-RIGHT To ENFORCE-One who hires an automobile
for a ride on Sunday cannot be compelled to pay for it, because the letting
of automobiles for pleasure rides is an exercise of the garage owner's ordi-
nary trade and calling, which is by statute prohibited on Sunday. Jones v.
Belle Isle, 79 S. E. Rep. 357 (Ga. 1913).
The common law in no way restricted the transaction of business or
the making of contracts on Sunday. Steere v. Trebilcock, 86 Minn. 297
(1902) ; Shuman v. Shuman, 27 Pa. 9o (I856). Sunday was, however, dies nott
Juridicus by a canon of the church incorporated into the common law by
the Saxon kings. Swann v. Broome, 3 Bur. i595 (Eng. 1764); Story v.
Elliot, 8 Cow. 27 (N. Y. 1827).
In England the Statute 29 Car. II (1678) forbade the exercise by any
person of the "work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's day." In
the United States similar statutes, though variously worded, have been
enacted in almost all the States. In Georgia and North Carolina the word-
ing of the English statute is followed, and only the exercise of one's "ordi-
nary business" is prohibited, Ga. Pen. Code, §422; N. C. Code, §3782. In
New Hampshire the wording is "work of his secular calling," Pub. St. c.
271, §3. In New York and Minnesota "all labor on Sunday is prohibited,
excepting the works of necessity or charity," N. Y. Con. Laws c. 40, §2143;
Minn. Gen. St. 1894, §65ro. The Pennsylvania Act of April 22, 1794, 2 P. &
L. 44o6, prohibits "any worldly employment or business whatsoever" on
Sunday.
If the making of the contract on Sunday involves such labor as is
prohibited by the act, such contracts have usually been held void and unen-
forcible, as in the principal case. Thompson v. Williams, 58 N. H. 248;
Berrill v. Smith, 2 Miles, 402 (Pa. i84o). The distinction is usually drawn
between contracts Wholly or in part executory, which will not be enforced
by the courts, and contracts executed, which will not be declared invalid be-
cause either made or performed on Sunday. Shuman v. Shuman, 27 Pa.
9o (i856).
On the subject of what constitutes a violation of the Sunday laws, the
decisions are in hopeless conflict, due probably to the differing terms of the
various statutes and to the strength of the puritanical convictions of the
court. Shaving in a barber shop, Common. v. Waldman, 8 Pa. C. C. 449
(i89o); Sunday baseball, lit re Rupp, 33 App. Div. 468 (N. Y. i898); sell-
ing newspapers, Common. v. Matthews, 152 Pa. i66 (1893) ; the sending of
unnecessary telegrams, Western Union Co. v. Henley, 23 Ind. App. 14 (I899),
have been held to be acts prohibited by the Sunday laws. Contracts for the
conveyance of land, Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N. C. 503 (i9O4); the hire
of a horse by a son to visit his father, Logan v. Matthews. 6 Pa. 417 (847) ;
the running of an excursion train, L. & N. R. Co. v. Common., 30 S. W.
Rep. 878 (Ky. i895), have been held acts not within the statute.
CORPORATIONS-PURCHASE OF NOTE-KNOWLEDGE OF OFFICFR-The presi-
dent of a bank had authority to buy negotiable paper. By fraud he obtained
from the maker a note which he sold to the bank, and in so doing acted as a
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transferor and agent of the bank. The bank sued the maker on this note.
Held: As the act of the agent in receiving the note was the act of the bank,
so the knowledge of the agent of the transaction was the knowledge of the
corporation. There is no room for a presumption that the agent has not
communicated his knowledge to his principal. First National Bank v. Burns,
lO3 N. E. Rep. 93 (Ohio, 1913).
The general rule is that the knowledge of the agent as to a transaction
which he is duly authorized to conduct for his principal, is the knowledge
of the principal. Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Reitz, 14 Ind. App. 478 (1896) ; Mo.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Finley, 38 Kan. 55o (1888); Md. Trust Co. v. Mechanics'
Bank, 102 Md. 6o8 (igo6); Nat. Bank v. Cushman, 139 Mass. 490 (1877);
Gaw v. Glassboro Co., 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. 416 (rgoo). The notice need not
come to the agent in the particular transaction. Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y.
131 (1885); yet it must be obtained while the agent is officially engaged
on behalf of the corporation which is his principal. Thomson v. Cent. Pass.
Ry. Co., 83 N. J. L. 777 (1912); Teagarden v. Lumber Co., 154 S. W. Rep.
973 (Tex. 1913). Notice as to something not within the sphere of the
agent's duty cannot be held to be notice to the corporation. McDermott v.
Hayes, 197 Fed. Rep. 129 (1912); Schwabacher Co. v. Murphine, 133 Pac.
Rep. 598 (Wash. 1913).
To the general rule there is an almost equally well-recognized excep-
tion; notice or knowledge on the part of the agent will not he implied to
the principal in cases where the agent's relations to the subject-matter are
adverse to his principal interest. High v. Opalite Tile Co., 184 Fed. Rep.
45o (1911); In re Senoia Mills, 193 Fed. Rep. 711 (1912); Wells, Fargo
& Co. v. Walker, 9 N. M. 456 (I898) ; Jacobus v. Jamestown Mantel Co.,
149 N. Y. App. 356 (1912); Victor Mining Co. v. Nat. Bank, 15 Utah, 391
(1897) ; Roberts v. Hughes, 83 Atl. Rep. 8o7 (Vt. 1912). These cases make
no distinction between natural and artificial principals. And when the offi-
cial of a corporation is acting in a dual capacity, as in the principal case,
if the court consider him as an individual acting for himself, his knowl-
edge is not imputed to the corporation. Koehler v. Dodge, 31 Neb. 328
(189); Benton v. Germ. Am. Bank, 122 Mo. 332 (1894); Robert v. Hughes
Co., supra. The principal case regards the transaction from the corpora-
tion's point of view and appears to have taken a step forward in practically
refusing to apply the exception above noted to the case where the principal
is a corporation.
CRIMINAL LAw-LARcENY-BREAKING BULK-The defendant broke open
a letter intrusted to him to mail and abstracted the money therefrom. Held:
The defendant was guilty of larceny. State v. Ruffin, 79 S. E. Rep. 417
(N. C. 1913).
It is conceded that a carrier or bailee who breaks a package in which
the goods are delivered to him and takes away and converts a part of the
goods, is guilty of larceny. Carrier's Case, Y. B. 13 Edw. IV., 9 P1. 5
(Eng. 1473) ; Robinson v. State, i Cold. 122 (Tenn. i86o); Burns v. State,
145 Wis. 373 (1911). And if several packages are delivered to a carrier,
a conversion of one of them will be a sufficient "breaking bulk" to constitute
larceny. Common. v. Brown, 4 Mass. 58o (i8o8); Nichols v. People, 17
N. Y. 114 (1858). The English doctrine, however, requires the particular
package to be broken. Rex v. Maddox, Russ. & R. 92 (Eng. 18o5); Rex v.
Pratley, 5 Car. & P. 533 (Eng. 1833). At any rate, such conversion termi-
nates the bailment, and it is larceny to afterwards convert one of the other
packages or articles. Rex v. Poyser, 2 Den. C. C. 233 (Eng. 1851). And
if after the package is broken, the bailee takes the whole contents, it is
larceny. Rex v. Brazier, Russ. & R. 337 (Eng. 1817). But no offence is
committed, if he takes away and converts the entire parcel. State v. Fair-
dough, 29 Conn. 47 (i86o).
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There is high authority for the position that the conviction in the prin-
cipal case could very well be sustained on the ground that the defendant had
only the care or custody of the property, and not the possession. Murphy
v. People, 104 Ill. 528 (1882); Williams v. State, 75 N. E. Rep. 875 (Ind.
i9o5); Walker v. State, 9 Ga. App. 863 (1911). A number of American
courts hold that where money or property is delivered to a person for mere
custody or for some specified purpose, the legal possession remains in the
owner, and the criminal conversion of it by the custodian is larceny. Justices
v. Henderson, 9o N. Y. 12 (1882); Common. v. Flynn, 167 Mass. 325 (897).
A distinction seems to have been drawn in certain English cases between the
delivery of money to be changed in the presence of the owner and the
delivery of money to be taken away and changed. The first case is larceny,
the second not. Reg. v. Thomas, 9 Car. & P. 741 (Eng. 1841); Reg. v.
Reynolds, 2 Cox, C. C. 170 (1847). But the New York cases refuse to
recognize any such distinction, and in Justices v. Henderson, supra, such a
distinction was expressly repudiated. And there are decisions elsewhere to
the same effect. Holbrook v. State, 107 Ala. 154 (1894); People v. Montarial,
120 Cal. 69 (1898) ; Williams v. State, 75 N. E. Rep. 259 (Ind. 19o5).
CRIMEs-LARCENY-INTENT TO RETURN-The quality of an act is deter-
mined by the intent with which it was committed. This point has been aptly
illustrated by three cases which have been recently reported. A trustee, misap-
propriating a check which belongs to the trust is guilty of statutory larceny,
although he had intended to repay the money and the money was in fact paid
for him, before complaint was made to a magistrate. People v. Shears, 143
N. Y. S. 861 (1913). If an officer of a company takes money with intent to
use it for his own purposes, he is guilty of larceny, although the company
was indebted to him in a sum equal to that taken, if the amount was not taken
in a bona fide intent to cancel the debt. People v. Barnes, 143 N. Y. S. 885
(1913). The accused, when arrested, had in his possession a sufficient amount
in checks and money to repay all that he had taken at different times, and it
is admitted that he would have repaid this to the company which he was man-
aging. Nevertheless, he is guilty of embezzlement, for at some periods in
his transactions, he was using money of the company, which he could not
have repaid with any securities then held by him. State v. Schumacher, 143
N. W. Rer. iiii (Ia. 1913).
The intention to return seems to be important only as it tends to show
whether the taking was to deprive the owner permanently of the use of his
property. People v. Brown, 105 Cal. 66 (1894). But if one take property,
intending later to return it and after that decides not to return the article,
that is larceny. Commonwealth v. White, 65 Mass. 483 (1853). In embez-
zlement, the intention to repay funds is never a defense. People v. Butes, 128
Mich. 208 (19Ol); People v. Lyon, 33 Hun. 623 (N. Y. 1884). Where prop-
erty is taken under claim of right, there can be no conviction of larceny,
Phelps v. People, 55 Ill. 334 (1870); although the claim was untenable, so
long as the property was taken openly and bona fide, People v. Moss, 187 N. Y.
410 (90). It has been held that where property has been taken and
pledged, and the taker has a reasonable hope of redeeming the articles, there
is no larceny. Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. R. 96 (I9o5); Rex. v.
Wright, 9 Car. & P. 554 n. (Eng. 1828). In the latter case the goods had
been actually returned before complaint made. But, at all events, there
must be more than a mere hope of being at some time able to return the
goods, to relieve the taker of his guilt. Truslow v. State, 95 Tenn. 189
(1895). The former return of other goods similarly taken is no defense.
State v. Fields, 6 Coldw. 524 (Tenn. 1869). The actual intention to return,
with no present ability, is no defense. Regina v. Trebilock, 7 Cox C. C. 468
(Eng. I858).
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EVIDENCE-COMPETENCY OF INFANT WITNESSEs-An infant witness will
not be disqualified solely because of his age. It is proper to admit the testi-
mony of a child of seven years, if the trial court is satisfied that he is capable
of recalling the matter on which he is to testify, of understanding and of
giving rational answers to the questions put to him, and of knowing that he
ought to speak the truth. Piepke v. Phila. & R. Ry. Co., 242 Pa. 321 (1913).
The case follows the test adopted for the first time in Brasier's Case, I
Leach's Crown Law, I99 (Eng. 1779). The decisions of those States which
have not enacted disqualifying statutes are in accord. Flanagin v. State, 25
Ark. 96 (i867) ; Davis v. State, 31 Neb. 347 (I89I). At one time, however,
an infant under the age of nine was not permitted to testify. Rex. v. Dunnel,
East's P. C. 442 (Eng. 1771).
It is universally recognized that, as a requisite for competency, there
must be a comprehension, arising from religious instruction, of the obligation
of an oath. State v. Douglas, 53 Kan. 669 (1894); Commonwealth v. Hut-
chinson, Io Mass. 225 (1813). If the child believes that any deviation from
the truth will be followed by appropriate punishment, it is competent, though
ignorant of the nature of the punishment. Wade v. State, 5o Ala. 164 (1873).
Similarly, ignorance of the penalty prescribed for perjury, or the fact that
the witness was too young to be liable for punishment therefor, is no objec-
tion. Commonwealth v. Robinson, I65 Mass. 426 (1896). The testimony of
a girl of nine years was admitted, though she did not know she would be
punished in the other world, but knew that she would be put in jail if she
swore to a lie. Carter v. State, 63 Ala. 52 (1879). However, dying declara-
tions of a child of four were excluded on the ground that it could not be
reasonably said that he could have comprehended a future state. Rex. Pike,
3 Car. & P. 598 (Eng. 1829). In a suit for divorce for adultery, it is im-
proper to allow the young children of the parties to testify regarding the
chastity of the defendant. Crowper v. Crowper, 44 Mich. i8o (I88O) ; contra,
Freeny v. Freeny, 8o Md. 4o6 (1895).
The fact that a child was incompetent to testify at the first trial will
not prevent his qualification as a witness at a second trial of the cause, if he
is then proved competent. Kelly v. State, 75 Ala. 21 (1883). A trial may
be adjourned in order that an infant witness may be instructed as to the
obligation of an oath. Commonwealth v. Lyne, 142 Mass. 577 (1886). As
to the latter practice, see also Rex v. Nicholas, 2 C. & K. 46 (Eng. 1844).
JUDGMENT-CoNcLUSIVENESS-MERITs-The receiver of an insolvent trust
company brought suit to enforce the statutory liability of the shareholders,
who pleaded the bar of a former decree dismissing a previous bill to enforce
the same liability against the same parties. Held: Parol evidence is admissible
to show that the former bill had been dismissed without reference to the
merits of the suit, because certain statutory prerequisites had not been com-
plied with, and that therefore the former decree was not a bar to this second
proceeding. Coyle v. Taunton Trust Co., IO3 N. E. Rep. 289 (Mass. 1913).
This decision is in accordance with the general rules as established by
modern practice. When a court of competent jurisdiction has judicially tried
and determined a right or fact, the judgment thereon, so long as it remains
unreversed, is conclusive upon the parties and there is privity with them in law
or estate. Hungerford's Appeal, 41 Conn. 322 (1874); Gyarfas v. Karpf, 83 N.
J. L. 387 (1912); Schwan v. Kelly, 173 Pa. 65 (1896); Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876). But there must have been an actual adjudication
of the controversy; a consideration and determination of the merits are
required. Hitchen v. Campbell, 2 BI. Rep. 827 (Eng. 1772); Sedden v.
Tutop, 6 T. R. 729 (Eng. 1796); Oklahoma City v. McMaster, 196 U. S. 529
(Io5); Weigley v. Coffman, 144 Pa. 489 (1891); Robb v. Coal Co., 216 Pa.
418 (1907) ; Leverett v. Rivers, 2o8 Mass. 241 (1911) ; Clark v. Scovill, 198
N. Y. 279 (igio); Lusk v. Chicago, 211 Ill. 183 (19o4). Thus a judgment
obtained because some statute had not been complied with in bringing the suit,
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Maxwell v. Clarke, 139 Mass. 112 (1885), or because the court had no juris-
diction, Butcher's Assoc. v. Boston, 137 Mass. 186 (1884); Weigley v. Coff-
man, .rupra, or because the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, Reid v. Cald-
well, 114 Ga. 676 (19O1); McDonald v. Hygienic Ice Co., 148 N. Y. App. 539
(igII), or because of some formal defect in the proceedings, Brackett v.
Hoitt, 20 N. H. 257 (I85o), is not a judgment upon the merits and therefore
no estoppel to further suit.
In order to be conclusive the record of the former judgment must show
on its face that the claim or demand in question was actually decided or must
have been actually adjudicated. Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 230 U.
S. 58 (1913); Cheathem Switch Co. v. Transit Co., 2o3 Fed. 285 (1913);
Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 202 (1868); Williams v. Row, 62 Pa. 118 (1869).
If, however, the judgment be general and unspecific, one line of cases hold
it to be prima facie conclusive. Hungerford's Appeal, supra; Myers v. King-
ston Coal Co., 126 Pa. 582 (1889) ; but another line holds it to be prima facie
not conclusive, De Sollar v. Hanscome, 158 U. S. 216 (1894); U. S. v. Lim
Jew, 192 Fed. Rep. 644 (191o); Newburyport Inst. v. Puffer, 201 Mass. 41
(19o9). In either case, however, extrinsic evidence, consistent with the rec-
ord, is admissible to show what was in fact raised and determined. Supples
v. Cannon, 44 Conn. 424 (1877) ; Clark v. Scovill, supra; Crest v. Brindle, 2
Rawle, 121 (Pa. 1828); Follersbee v. Walker, 74 Pa. 3o6 (1873); Post v.
Smilie, 48 Vt. x85 (1876). When evidence dehors the record is received as
to what was included and adjudicated in the former action, the question is
for the jury. Kaster v. Welsh, 157 Pa. 590 (1898).
INSURANCE--PRoHI13ITIVE COVENANT-BREACH-EXTINGUISIH MENT-Upon
the question whether a breach of a covenant against vacancy for longer
than thirty days without the insurer's permission would operate as a for-
feiture, or a suspension merely, of the liability upon the policy where the
vacancy had been ended prior to the loss, and was in nowise contributory
thereto, has been recently considered in Maine. In an exhaustive discussion of
the cases ruling that such breach operated as an absolute forfeiture, the
court ruled that "it is not a question of whether the insured has been in-
jured by the breach of the contract, but whether the contract itself has been
broken. If not, the rights of the parties remain unchanged. If it has, then
by its own terms the contract is rendered void. And this word void, being
neither ambiguous nor technical, should be construed according to the com-
mon meaning of the language. It means null, of no effect. The contract
clearly forbids any such infermittent liabilities" (i. e., suspension during
continuance of the breach, and revivification after "curing of the breach"),
Dolliver v. The Granite Ins. Co., 89 Atl. Rep. 8 (Me. 1913).
This is one more emphatic decision on the "strict" side of the line of
insurer's liability where he defends on the ground of breach by the insured
of a warranty against certain conditions on the premises during the term
of the risk. The court referred to, but refused to adopt the contrary view
to the effect that a breach of such prohibitions operated as a suspension of
the risk during continuance of the breach, liable to be asserted as a ground of
forfeiture at the instance of the insurer during but not after such time, and
that with removal of the objectionable conditions affecting the premises the
liability on the insurer revived, provided always that the breach in no way
induced or contributed to the loss. This latter view is forcefully presented
by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in McClure v.
:Ins. Co., 242 Pa. 59 (1913); for a discussion of the authorities presenting
Ihese two views, see a Note on the Pennsylvania case in 62 U. OF P. L. R.
'72IO (Jan. 1914).
LIBEL-PRIvI.EGE-REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRAE-A report,
published by. a newspaper, of proceedings before a magistrate, having general
jurisdiction over the matter under inquiry, is privileged, irrespective of
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whether the jurisdiction was properly exercised or whether the court had
jurisdiction of the accused's person. Lee v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., lO3
N. E. Rep. x55 (N. Y. 1913).
It is a general rule that impartial and accurate reports of judicial pro-
ceedings are qualifiedly privileged. Willman v. Press Pub. Co., 49 N. Y. App.
Div. 35 (19oo) ; Kimber v. Press, i Q. B. 65 (Eng. 1893). Reports of pre-
liminary and ex parte proceedings, though published before a final determina-
tion of the action, are within the rule. Lewis v. Levy, 27 L. J. Q. B. 282
(Eng. 1858) ; Metcalf v. Times Pub. Co., 2o R. I. 674 (igoi) ; Bissell v. Press
Pub. Co., 62 Hun, 551 (N. Y. .97). It has been held that an application to
a justice of the peace for permission to make an affidavit, for the purpose of
instituting a prosecution, is one step in a judicial proceeding and therefore,
though such application be denied, a report thereof is privileged. Beiser v.
Scripps-McRae Pub. Co., 113 Ky. 383 (19o2). The same principle applies to
the issuance of a search warrant. Warden v. Whalen, 8 Pa. C. C. 66o (189o).
A report that a person has been arrested and held for examination on a
particular charge is privileged, provided that it contains no assumption of
guilt. Bullitt v. Times-Democrat, 1O7 La. 751 (19o2). However, complaints
made to police officers charging persons with the commission of crimes are
not judicial proceedings, within the meaning of the general rule. Jastrzembski
v. Marxhauser, 120 Mich. 677 (1899). The same applies to proceedings before
a magistrate, who is merely asked for advice and is not called upon to act in
his official capacity. McGregor v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 24 (Eng. 1824). Privi-
lege does not extend to pleadings filed in court, upon which no judicial action
has been taken. Amer. Pub. Co. v. Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663 (19o6).
It is the duty of the judge to exclude irrelevant evidence; if therefore,
such evidence is admitted and subsequently reported, it is not the fault of the
reporter. Ryalls v. Leader, L. R. I Ex. 300 (Eng. 1866). Hence, on prin-
ciple, it seems that the principal case, which is in accord with the English
case of Usill v. Hales, 47 L. J. C. P. 323 (Eng. 1878), may be upheld, on the
ground that the reporter could not be expected to know whether or not all
legal requirements had been complied with. For reasons of public policy,
which demands that inconvenience and even hardship be suffered rather than
that proceedings before judicial tribunals be kept secret, the publisher ought
not be bound at his peril to determine doubtful questions of law.
MARRIAGE-NULLITY-REFUSAL TO CONSUMMATE-NO inference of in-
capacity will be drawn merely because a wife wilfully and steadfastly refuses
to consummate the marriage. However, since the contract of marriage un-
plies the willingness as well as the ability to consummate it; when there is
such a refusal, a decree of nullity of marriage will be granted, though there
is no proof of incapacity. Dickinson v. Dickinson, lO9 Law Times, 408 (Eng.
ing upon the partnership upon proof that the lands referred to in it were
partnership property. Nichols v. Burcham, 143 N. W. Rep. 647 (Mich. 1913).
Although it was recognized in G. v. G., 25 L. T. 510 (Eng. 187), that"without sexual intercourse the ends of marriage, the procreation of children,
and the pleasures and enjoyments of matrimony cannot be attained," a
marriage will not be annulled on the ground of sterility, if copulation is not
impossible. Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371 (1877). But a marriage may be
avoided if one of the parties is permanently incapable of sexual intercourse
at the time the ceremony is performed. Payne v. Payne, 46 Minn. 467
(I89I). The same is true where the incapacity is incurable and there is a
refusal to submit to treatment. L. v. L., 7 P. D. 16 (Eng. 1882). No relief
can be obtained if the incapacity arises after marriage. Bascomb v. Bas-
comb, 25 N. H. 267 (1852).
At one time the law required a cohabitation of three years, in order 
to
ascertain whether the non-consummation was due to mere coyness 
on the
part of the woman. If at the end of that time there had been no connection,
a presumption of physical incapacity was raised. Stagg v. Edgecomb, 3 Sw.
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& Tr. 24o (Eng. 1863). Later, such an inference was drawn from a refusal
to consummate after a cohabitation of only a few days. C. v. C., 27 Times
L. R. 421 (Eng. i911). Previous to the decision of the principal case, it was
repeatedly held that a decree of nullity would not be granted solely because
of a wilful and wrongful refusal to consummate. Merrill v. Merrill, 126
Mass. 228 (1878); H. v. B., P. D. (Eng. ipoi). However, the result of the
principal case was obtained by indulging a presumption of incapacity from
the fact of continued refusal. F. v. P., 75 L. T. 192 (Eng. 1896) ; contra, Mer-
rill v. Merrill, suPra.
PARTNERSHIP-CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF L.%NDs-One of the partners
gave the complainant an option for the sale of certain lands and subsequently
entered into a contract of sale with him. The other partner refused to
carry out the contract and the land was conveyed by the partners to a third
party. Held: The fact of partnership being established, the option was bind-
ing upon the-proof that the lands referred to in it were partnership prop-
erty. Nichols v. Burcham, 143 N. W. Rep. 647 (Mich. 1913).
This decision is in accord with the rule in England, where it is pro-
vided by statute that partnership realty is to be considered as converted into
personalty for all purposes. British Partnership Act (x89o), §22. The rule
in Canada is in accord. Re Fulton, 7 Ont. L. Rep. 445 (1904).
In America there are divergent views as to the treatment of partnership
realty. In some jurisdictions an executory contract for the sale of partner-
ship lands is binding on the firm. Rovelsky v. Brown, 92 Ala. 522, 9 So. Rep.
z82, 25 Am. St. Rep. 83 (i89o); Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. I, 13 Am.
St. Rep. 550 (1873). And by the weight of authority it seems that partner-
ship realty will be considered personalty as between the partners themselves
and those who deal knowingly with one of them. Moore v. Wood, 171 Pa.
365, 33 Atl. Rep. 63 (1895); West Hickory, etc., Ass'n v. Reed, 80 Pa. 38
(1875). So a judgment against an individual partner has been held not to be a
lien against partnership realty. Meily v. Wood, 7i Pa. 488, io Am. Rep. 719
(1872); Moore v. Wood, supra. So also one partner can make a valid oral
release of his interest in partnership land. Morrill v. Colehour, 82 111. 618
(1876). But one partner cannot convey the firm interest in partnership
land without the consent of the other partner or partners. Foster's Appeal,
74 Pa. 39i, 15 Am. Rep. 553 (1873). Where by the partnership agreement it
appears that it was the intention of the partners that the partnership realty
should be treated and administered as personalty for all purposes, effect
will be given thereto. Leaf's Appeal, io5 Pa. 505 (1884) ; Darrow v. Calkins,
154 N. Y. 503, 48 L. R. A. 299 (1897).
To the extent that partnership realty may be required to pay partnership
obligations, or to pay any balance due from one partner to another, it is
almost universally the rule that it will be considered personalty. Brewer v.
Browne, 68 Ala. 210 (i8go); Hewitt v. Rankin, 41 Ia. 35 (1875); Foster's
Appeal, supra. But after the debts of the partnership have been piid part-
nership realty will be considered as such for the purposes of dissolution or
distribution, so that the heirs of a deceased partner are entitled to partition.
Comstock v. McDonald, 126 Mich. r4, 85 N. W. Rep. 579 (19or). Coucra,
where there is either an express or implied agreement to consider it realty
for all purposes. Darrow v. Calkins, supra.
PRI14CIPAL AND AGENT-CONSIGNMENT SALES--RGHTS op Bona Fide
PURCHASER-A piano company consigned pianos to an agent with restricted
powers to sell. The agent violated his authority and sold a piano to the
defendant, who was ignorant of existing conditions. Held: As the company
clothed its agent with such indicia of ownership that the defendant was in-
duced to deal with such agent as principal, it cannot maintain an action of
replevin against the vendee. Cable Co. v. Miller, 143 N. E. Rep. 94 (Iowa,
1913).
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This decision is in accord with the general rule on this point. Connolly
v. McConnell, 39 At. Rep. 773 (Del. 1897); Calais Steamboat Co. v. Van Pelt,
2 Black. 372 (U. S. 1862); Koch v. Willi, 63 Ill. 144 (1872). But, if it can
be proved that the vendee of the agent knew that no authority existed he
must lose, for an owner cannot be deprived of his property without his
consent unless he has placed it in the custody of another and given him
an apparent right to dispose of it. Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427 (1872).
Nor is the principal bound when the vendee ought to have known of the
agency, as is the case where the vendee knows that the agent acts sometimes
as principal and sometimes as agent. If the vendee does not ascertain in
which capacity the agent is acting in the transaction involved, he takes the
risk of the dishonesty of the agent. Miller v. Lea, 35 Md. 396 (1871) ; Evans
Y. Wan, 71 Pa. 69 (187); Baxter v. Sherman, 76 N. W. Rep. 211 (Minn.x8g8). ,
PROPERTY-BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-PARTIES TO AcTioN-Action by
grantor and covenantee to enjoin threatened breach of a building restriction
by purchaser with notice from the grantee and covenantor. Injunction
granted although the covenantee had no other land in the vicinity of the
property in question, and although he could prove no damage from the
threatened breach. Vansant v. Rose, 1O3 N. E. Rep. 194 (IIl. 1913).
This is based on the ground that a threatened breach is in itself ground
for an injunction, Hartman v. Wells, 257 -Il. 167 (i9r3); and no damage
need be shown, Steward v. Winters, 4 Sandf. Ch. 587 (1846); Topping v.
Eckersley, 2 Kay & J. 264 (Eng. I855). In all of those cases, however, the
covenant was entered into by the predecessor in title, for the benefit of the
could not have shown any substantial damage from the threatened breach.
But if a covenantee, having several lots, has sold all, he can no longer main-
tain an action for the breach of covenants as to building restrictions on any
of the lots. Dana v. Wentworth, iii Mass. 291 (1873). An action cannot
be sustained by anyone but the covenantee, unless it can be shown that the
covenant was entered into by the predecessor on title, for the benefit of the
land, which is now held by the party who is attempting to enjoin the breach,
and that both properties were at one time owned by the predecessor in title
of the one suing. Hill v. Metzenroth, 173 Mass. 423 (1899) ; Beals v. Case,
138 Mass. 138 (1884). Furthermore, the complainant must have known of
the covenant at the time of the purchase and must have relied upon it, in
purchasing the property. Clapp v. Wilder, 176 Mass. 322 (1900); Coughlin
v. Bender, 46 Mo. App. 54 (I891).
SALFS-CHANGE OF PossEssIoN-FRAu--The vendee bought a horse from
the vendor and kept it for a month. Then they entered into partnership, the
vendee to furnish the horse and the vendor a wagon. In the course of the
business, the horse was kept sometimes by the vendee and sometimes by the
vendor. Later the horse was attached and sold by a creditor of the vendor
in payment of a debt arising after the sale of the horse to the vendee.
Held: There was no fraud' at law and it was a proper question for the
jury whether there was fraud in fact. Nathenson v. Crossland, 54 Pa.
Super. Ct. 61o (i913).
The States are about evenly divided in their attitude toward the effect
of retention of possession by vendor after sale. Some States hold that
the retention of possession is fraud prima facie, Brooks v. Powers, 15 Mass.
244 (1818); Miller v. Shreve, 29 N. J. L. 25o (1861). Other States hold
that it is fraud per se. Ketchell v. Bratton, 2 Ill. 300 (1836). Pennsylvania
follows this latter rule. Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275 (1819). To make
the sale valid, there must be delivery, either actual if the goods are capable
of actual delivery, or constructive if they are not. McKibben v. Martin, 64
Pa. 352 (187o). The transfer must be permanent; it is not enough that the
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property is in the vendee's possession for a short time-for an hour, Young
v. McClure, 2 W. & S. 147 (Pa. 1841); for part of a day, McBride v. Mc-
Clelland, 6 IV. & S. 94 (Pa. 1843). However when the transfer is apparently
permanent and bona fide, there is no "legal fraud"--that is, fraud per se-
and it is a question for the jury whether there was fraud in fact or not;
delivery for four weeks, Graham v. McCreary, 4o Pa. 519 (1861); de-
livery for six weeks, Brady v. Haines, I8 Pa. 113 (1851). The principal
case is therefore in accord with the existing law.
SCHOOLS-RFGULATIONS-RIGHT TO EXCLUDE Pupn.-A pupil, having fallen
below the standard required by the committee of a high school, was ex-
cluded. Held: Under Rev. Laws, c. 44, §3, "The right of every child to
attend the public schools is subject to such reasonable regulations as to
qualifications of pupilb to be retained in the respective schools as the school
committee shall prescribe," the school committee has power to establish and
maintain standards of scholarship, and as long as the committee acts in
good faith, their conduct in applying such standards is not subject to review
by any other tribunal. Barnard v. Inhab. of Shelburne, 102 N. E. Rep.
1o95 (Mass. 1913).
This deals directly with the reasonableness and validity of regulations
established by school committees, etc., where like statutes have been enacted.
The reasonableness of any such regulation is a question of law. Fertich v.
Michener, III Ind. 472 (1887). The following rules have been held reason-
able: Suspension for absence or tardiness, except in case of illness, more
than a certain number of times in a fixed period. Burdick v. Babcock, 31
Iowa, 562 (z871) ; failure to come prepared with a required exercise, Sewell
v. Board of Defiance Union School, 29 Ohio St. 89 (1876); refusing to
write a required English composition, Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224 (1859).
But on the other hand it has been held that a rule is not reasonable which
will deprive a child of school privileges unless as a punishment for a
breach of discipline or an offense against good morals, Perkins v. School
District, 56 Iowa, 476 (1881), such as a rule which requires pupils to pay
for school property which they have carelessly broken, with the alternative
of being excluded, State v. Vanderbilt, i6 Ind. II (1888); Perkins v.
School District, supra; Holman v. School Trustees of Avon, 77 Mich.
605 (1889). Likewise a rule that during the school term no pupil shall
attend a social function. State v. Osborn, 32 Mo. App. 536 (1888).
In any event the enforcement of a school regulation must be reasonable
under the circumstances and due regard must be had to the age, health
and mental condition of the pupil under the peculiar circumstances of each
case. Fertich v. Michener, ii Ind. 472 (1887).
STATUTE OF LIMITATION-ToLLING OF STATUTE-WHEN IS A NEW SUIT A
CONTINUATION OF OLD?-A statute provided that if after commencement of
an action plaintiff "fail" therein for any cause except negligence, a new
action may be brought within five years after such determination, and be
deemed a continuation of the first action. Held: This only applies where
plaintiff fails to obtain a decision on the merits from a cause other than
negligence in prosecution of his suit, and not to effect the period of limita-
tions, where the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his former action because
he thought certain rulings of the court were erroneous. Penna. Co. v.
Good, 1o3 N. E. 672 (Ind. 1913).
At common law, suits frequently failed of a decision on their merits
on account of some matter of form. In such case, the plaintiff was per-
mitted, within a reasonable time, to sue out a new writ, and such renewal
suit was deemed a continuation of the first. The time which was reasonable
for such purpose was computed theoretically with reference to the number
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of days required for plaintiff to journey to the place where the court was
held, and hence the name "Journey's Account." Spencer's Case, 6 Coke, IO;
Elebot v. Thorowgood, I Ld. Raym. 283 (Eng. 1693).
This ancient remedy is not now recognized in this country, but, in lieu
thereof, statutes, such as that in our principal case, have been passed in
nearly all of the States. These statutes, moreover, do not contemplate a
renewal or continuance of the forms as at common law under "Journey's
Account," but that a new and distinct suit shall be commenced, which shall
be treated as a continuation of such former suit.
It is well settled that a properly instituted claim voluntarily abandoned
cannot be made available in a subsequent action to save it from the opera-
tion of the statute of limitations. Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch. 462
(U. S. 1814) ; Hayes v. Stewart, 23 Vt. 623 (185I); Pardley v. Mechanics-
ville, ioi Iowa, 266 (I897). The purpose of such statute is to relieve a
person, who in the exercise of due diligence, within the time limited by
the general statute of limitation, has attempted to enforce a claim by suit
and has failed by reason of some matter of form which can be remedied
in a new proceeding. It was not intended to encourage default or negli-
gence in prosecution or conduct of a suit duly and properly commenced
and legally pending in court. Cummings v. Jacobs, 130 Mass. 419 (88I).
To do so would be to allow a man to take advantage of neglect, intentional
or inexcusable, and still hold his adversary liable after the limit of time
made by law his ample defense. Lawrence v. Winifrede Coal Co., 48 W. Va.
'39 (1900).
A plaintiff cannot be said to "fail" within the meaning of the statute
unless he makes an unavailing effort to succeed. Penna. Co. v. Good, supra.
Furthermore, a failure in such case imports some action by the court, by
which plaintiff is defeated without a trial, upon the merits. Siegfried v.
N. Y., etc., R. Co., 5o Ohio St. 294 (1893).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-WHAT IS SUFFICIENT ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
THE DeT-In response to creditor's demand for payment, the debtor wrote:
"I will try to pay you soon if this sickness does not continue too long
so as to clean me all up." Held: In the absence of evidence that the con-
ditions referred to existed at the time of the commencement of suit, the
words were not sufficient acknowledgment of the debt to toll the statute
of limitations. Koop v. Cook, 135 Pac. Rep. 317 (Ore. 1913).
In order to avoid the operation of the statute of limitations, there must
be either an express promise to pay; or an acknowledgment, containing an
unqualified and direct admission of a previous subsisting debt, which the
promisor is liable and willing to pay; or a promise to pay upon a condition
which is shown to exist or to have been performed. Bell v. Morrison, I
Pet. 351 (U. S. 1828); France v. Ruby, i4o N. W. Rep. 175 (Neb. 1913);
Hart v. Pendergast, 14 M. & W. 740 (Eng. 1845); Woodbury v. Wood-
bury, 47 N. H. iI (i866). "I cannot pay the sum you claim, but will pay
sum I named," is an express promise. Manchester v. Braedner, 107 N. Y.
346 (1887). "I cannot pay in cash, but you can take certain goods," is merely
an offer. Smith v. Eastman, 3 Cush. 355 (Mass. 1849). A mere reference
to an indebtedness, although consistent with its existing validity and imply-
ing no disposition to question its binding obligation, is not an acknowl-
edgment Hanson v. Tawle, i9 Kans. 273 (1877). A promise to examine
accounts and to pay what is owing is not sufficient. Hayward v. Gunn, 4
Ill. App. 161 (1879). "I will pay as soon as possible" is too uncertain and
indefinite to amount to a conditional promise. Norton v. Shepherd, 48 Conn.
141 (i88o). However, a promise to pay "when convenient" or "when able"
will toll the statute, when the creditor can prove that it is convenient or that
there is ability to pay. Tebo v. Robinson, ioo N. Y. 27 (I885); Hartranft's
Estate, 153 Pa. 530 (i893). As to what constitutes ability to pay, see Work
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v. Beach, i3 N. Y. Suppl. 678 (i89I). It is not necessary to prove ability
up to the commencement of suit; as soon as it exists, a right of action
accrues. Denney v. Wheelwright, 6o Miss. 733 (i883). The statute begins
to run again as soon as the condition is removed, whether or not the prom-
isee knew of it. Waters v. Thanet, 2 Q. B. 757 (Eng. 1842).
A new promise made, either before or after the bar is complete, will
avoid the operation of the statute. Yaw v. Kerr, 47 Pa. 333 (1864). It is
immaterial that, at the time of making the new promise, the promisor was
unaware that the debt was barred. O'Hara v. Murphy, i96 Ill. 599 (I9O2).
An acknowledgment may be in whole or in part. Wetzell v. Bussard, ii
Wheat. 309 (U. S. 1826). Several insufficient acknowledgments cannot be
taken together to constitute a sufficient one. Simrell v. Miller, i69 Pa. 326
(i895).
ToRTS-CONSPIRAcY-AcTIoN FOR INJURY To BusINEss-In a civil suit
brought for the recovery of damages caused by an alleged conspiracy to
destroy the plaintiff's business, charges of malicious prosecution, slander,
trespass upon real property and maintenance of nuisances were all included.
Held: A conspiracy in itself cannot be made the subject of a civil action.
Damage is the gist of the action, not the conspiracy. The complaint does
not show a single, individual wrong, but an aggregation of certain tortious
acts for each of which a separate action will lie. Bowman v. Wohlke, 135
Pac. Rep. 37 (Cal. 1913).
The common law action of conspiracy is obsolete and in lieu thereof
an action on the case has been substituted, differing from the ordinary
action only in that it charges the acts complained of upon several instead
of upon one. Stevens v. Rowe, 59 N. H. 578 (188o). Inasmuch as damage
is the gist of the action, a mere conspiracy without carrying out the pur-
pose of the conspiracy or perpetrating some wrong, is not the subject of a
civil action, however atrocious its purpose. Davitt v. American Bakers'
Union, 124 Cal. 99 (1899). Though it is usual to charge the conspiracy in
the declaration, the averment is immaterial and need not be proved. Green
v. Davies, 182 N. Y. 499 (1905). The charge of conspiracy does not change
the nature of the act; injury is the gist of the action and the liability is for
doing, not conspiring. Hundley v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., io5 Ky.
162 (898).
Although a conspiracy is charged, yet if on the trial the evidence con-
nects but one person with the wrong actually committed, the plaintiff may
recover against him as if he had been sued alone. Fillman v. Ryon, i68 Pa.
484 (i895). Allegation and proof of the conspiracy are only important to
connect a defendant with the transaction and to charge him with the acts
and declarations of his co-conspirators, where otherwise he could not have
been implicated, Brackett v. Griswold, 12 N. Y. 454 (i889), or in aggrava-
tion of the charge. Doremus v. Hennessy, 62 Ill. App. 391 (1895).
As opposed to the principal case, many courts uphold a declaration which
contains charges of several distinct acts if these combine to constitute a
series, all of which are aimed at a single result such as the destruction of
one's business. Oliver v. Perkins, 92 Mich. 304 (1892). If there is one
conspiracy embracing within its scope numerous transactions, one suit is
sufficient. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Kindred, i4 Fed. Rep. 77 (i88i). And
where a libel was alleged in a complaint for conspiracy, the court said it
was not to be construed as joining a cause of action for libel with that for
a conspiracy, but only as stating matter of aggravation. Murray v. Mc-
Garigle, 69 Wis. 483 (1887).
TORTs-LIABILITY OF VENDOR OF AUTOMOBILE FOR AcT OF CHAUFFEUR LENT
TO PURCHAsER-The defendant company sold an automobile and in accord-
ance with its custom in cases where the purchaser was inexperienced, ordered
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a chauffeur in its employ to drive the car through a crowded part of the
city. Held: The defendant was liable for the negligence of the chauffeur
during such trip, though on the way, at the purchaser's request, he stopped
for supplies which the purchaser had bought. Dalrymple v. Covey Motor
Car Co., 135 Pac. Rep. 91 (Ore. 1913).
As a general rule, the master is liable for the acts of his servant com-
mitted within the scope of the employment, though they are unauthorized
or even forbidden. Sarver v. Mitchell, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 69 (1907); Slater
v. Advance Thresher Co., 97 Minn. 3o5 (19o6); Clark v. Buckmobile, 107
N. Y. App. Div. 120 (1905). In determining whether or not a particular
act was within the scope, the decisive question is whether the servant was
engaged in doing anything in furtherance of the master's business. Brown
v. Jarvis, 166 Mass. 75 (1896). Yet, a servant sent to perform work for
another person, with whom a contract for its performance has been made
by his master, does not by that fact alone become a servant of the latter.
Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287 (1905). However, if the latter is vested
for a time with exclusive control, with the right to discharge, he alone is
responsible for the servant's acts. Brown v. Smith, 86 Ga. 274 (1890). The
question who had the right to control is more important than who did
control. Linnehan v. Rollins, 137 Mass. 123 (1884). The temporary master
must have the right to direct not only what shall be done, but also how
it shall be done. Singer v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518 (1889). Though the courts
are agreed that "right of control" is the determining factor, they differ
in applying the doctrine to particular facts. Thus, in a recent English case
where facts correspond to those of the principal case, a contrary conclusion
was reached. Perkins v. Stead, 23 Times L. R. 433 (Eng. 19o7). On the
other hand, it was held that, where, in compliance with a contract of sale
of an automobile, the vendor supplied a chauffeur to reach the purchaser
to operate it, the vendor was liable for the chauffeur's negligence. Burnham
v. Central Auto Exchange, 67 AtI. Rep. 429 (R. I. 1907). See also Hiroux
v. Baum, ii8 N. W. Rep. 533 (Wis. 1908).
TORTS-PRIVATE NuISANcE-One, who by lewd conduct has damaged the
reputation of a hotel, is answerable to the landlord in an action for private
nuisance, for such damages as the landlord may be able to prove. Hall v.
Galloway, 135 Pac. Rep. 478 (Wash. 1913).
From the nature of the act and the damage resulting therefrom, it
would seem that nuisance should lie, for one who continually brings per-
sons into hired rooms and uses the premises for assignation, is answerable
in nuisance for the damage sustained by the lessor of the room for the
damage done to the reputation of her house. Sullivan v. Waterman, 20
R. I. 372 (1898). Nor, at least so far as public nuisances are concerned,
need the act constituting the nuisance be continuous. The use of profane
words on a single occasion may amount to a public nuisance. State v. Chrisp,
85 N. C. 528 (1881). Nor need there be a repetition of any word which
amounts a public nuisance to support an indictment. State v. Toole. io6
N. C. 736 (i8go). The result is sustained on other grounds in 27 HARV.
L. R. 290.
TRESPASS-RIGHT TO KILL TRESPASSING ANIMALs-A land owner killed a
neighbor's turkeys which were trespassing upon his land and destroying his
grain. Held: The killing was not justified as the land owner might have
impounded the turkeys or brought an action for damages for the injury
done to his land. James v. Tindall, 88 At. Rep. ioo3 (Del. 1913).
In the early law, a man could exercise his right of self-help only when
the law gave no adequate remedy; as long as there was an adequate remedy,
he had to use it. Thus in the protection of property from the trespass of
domestic animals, as the law gave the land owner the right to distrain upon
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the animals damage feasant, or to sue the owner for damages, be could
not take the law into his own hands until the legal remedies were inadequate.
Snap v. People, ig Ill. 8o (1857). The modern attitude is to allow the
land owner to use reasonable means to protect his property. There must
be apparent necessity for defence, honestly believed to be real, and the
acts done must be reasonable. Anderson v. Smith, 7 IIl. App. 354 (1880).
The jury must decide whether the means used were reasonable considering
the value of the property protected, the value of the animal and its char-
acter, whether harmless or dangerous, the practicability of all other means
of defence and the imminence of the danger. Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N. H.
398 (1873). Thus it has been held justifiable to kill a dog coming to carry
away dried fish, King v. Kline, 6 Pa. 318 (1847); or to kill dogs which
had frequently run through and destroyed a wheat field, Lipe v. Black-
welder, 25 Ill. App. 123 (1886). On the other hand it was not justifiable
to kill trespassing chickens, Clark v. Keliher, 107 Mass. 4o6 (1871); or
turkeys destroying grain, Reis v. Stratton, 23 Ill. App. 35 (1887). Thus the
decision in the principal case seems correct, though the reasoning follows the
older view of the law.
TRovm AND CONVERSION ELEMENTS-A tenant of a farm left stacks of hay
upon the land at the close of his term. He subsequently removed part of the
hay, but in doing so cut deep ruts in the land. When he returned to re-
move the remainder of the hay, the succeeding tenant, in order to protect
his real estate from further harm, would not let him enter upon the land.
Held: As there was no claim of ownership in the hay and as the pro-
tection of the real estate was justifiable, there was no conversion. Sears v.
Sovie, i43 N. Y. Sup. 317 (1913).
The gist of the action of trover lies in the wrongful conversion. War-
ing v. Penna. R. R., 76 Pa. 491 (1874). Conversion is defined as being "an
unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods
or personal chattels belonging to another to the alteration of their condition
or the exclusion of the owner's rights." Industrial Trust vs. Tod, 17o N. Y.
233 (19o2). Thus the plaintiff, in order to sustain an action of trover, must
show that the defendant asserted a right of ownership over the chattels in
question. Conversely, there can be no conversion unless the defendant has
asserted a right of ownership over the chattels, no matter what else he may
have done. Thus it was held to be no conversion to turn loose a pair of
horses, although by that act they were lost; Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 M. & W.
54o (Eng. 1841); nor to refuse to tear down part of a house in order to
allow the removal of a piano; Berry v. Friedman, 192 Mass. 131 (19o6).
The defendant may even act intentionally upon the chattel of another to the
distruction of it and this act will not be a conversion if done in the pro-
tection of the defendant's property. In McKeesport Saw Mill Co. v. Penna.
Co., 122 Fed. Rep. 184 (igo3), the defendant was held to be guilty of no
conversion although it, in order to protect its bridge, dislodged and destroyed
the barge of the plaintiff company. However, as soon as the defendant
claims a right of ownership in himself, he is guilty of conversion. Nichols
v. Newsome, 2 Murphy, 302 (N. C. 1813); McKay v. Pearson, 6 Pa. Super.
Ct. 529 (1898) ; Erskine v. Savage, 96 Me. 57 (1gor). But in the principal
case, as there was no right of ownership asserted, and as there was justifica-
tion for the refusal to enter, the decision is clearly in accord with the ex-
isting law.
TRUSTs-TETAMENTARY-PRCATORY Woas-The testator, by a holo-
graphic will, devised to his wife all his estate, desiring her to own the same
just as "I now hold and own or shall hold and own at the date of my death,"
her interest to be as absolute as the testator's and not to be taken as a
trust to be enforced by any other court than her own conscience, etc. The
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next paragraph enjoined on her to reserve to herself the homestead and
sufficient means for the support of herself and family, and provided that
if she should marry (which she did not) that the property should be divided
between the children of herself and testator according to the statute of dis-
tribution. The next paragraph appointed her executor and added the desire
that the testator's interest in a mercantile firm should remain unchanged
unless a change was necessary. Held: The will vested in the widow the
fee in the testator's property, without a trust or other limitations. Fellows v.
Durfey, et al., 79 S. E. Rep. 621 (N. C. 1913).
This decision is illustrative of the modern tendency to hold that pre-
catory words in a will hearing on the discretion of the devisee as to the dis-
position of the property devised will not impose a trust where there is an
evident intention to make an absolute devise by the will. Lambe v. Eames,
L. R. 6 Ch. App. 597 (1871); Bristol v. Austin, 40 Conn. 438 (1872); Good
v. Fichthorn, 144 Pa. 287 (i8gi); In re Williams, 2 Chan. 12 (1897).
The early courts were disposed to raise a trust on precatory words, not-
withstanding the fact that there was an absolute devise, where the "objects"
and "subject matter" of the supposed trust were definite and certain. Hard-
ing v. Glyn, I Atk. 469 (Eng. 1739); Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 333
(Eng. 1794). This rule has been followed in some modern decisions. Bohon
v. Barrett, 79 Ky. 378 (1881); Murphy v. Carlin, 113 Mo. 112 (1892).
Especially where the relations between the testator and the supposed bene-
ficiary have been such as to indicate a motive on the part of one to provide
for the other. Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis. 172, 48 Am. Rep. 487 (I883); Colton
v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300 (1887). But it is the modern tendency to hold that
to cut down an absolute devise imperative sense so to do must affirmatively
appear. Pennocds Estate, 20 Pa. 268 (1853); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 123
Pa. 329 (1888). It seems that this will be implied where a power of aliena-
tion is coupled with an absolute devise and there are also precatory words
disposing of the remainder upon the death of the devisee. In such case
the tendency of the courts is to hold the precatory words to be mandatory
and the estate of the devisee a life estate, thus sustaining the evident in-
tention of the testator. Dickinson's Estate, 209 Pa. 59 (1904); Fassitt v.
Seip, 24o Pa. 4o6 (1913).
Wmus-Girr TO CHILDREN-ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN EXCLUDE--The
testatrix left the residue of her estate in trust for all of A's children. A
had six illegitimate children whom the testatrix knew, and two legitimate
children. Held: From the facts it is highly probable that the testatrix in-
tended to make provision for the illegitimate children, but this intention is
not expressed in the will. Consequently the legitimate children alone can take
under it. Re Pearce, iog L. T. Rep. 514 (Eng. 1913).
This decision is in accord with the weight of authority both in England
and America. The primary meaning of the word "children" is ligitimate
off-spring. Dunn v. Cory, 56 N. J. Eq. 507 (1898); In re Hunt's Estate, 133
Pa. 26o (i8go) ; Bealeford v. Slaugenhaupt, 213 Pa. 565 (i9o6); In re Potter,
71 Hun, 77 (N. Y. 1893); and this does not include illegitimate children.
Hughes v. Knowlton, 37 C6nn. 429 (187o); Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254
(igoo); Appel v. Byers, 98 Pa. 479 (1881). But illegitimate children may
take under exceptional circumstances, as for instance, by express reference
to illegitimacy in the will. Barnett v. Ingwell, 31 Bea. 232 (Eng. 1862);
where there are no ligitimates. Wilkinson v. Adams, I V. & B. 465 (Eng.
1812). These cases fall under the general principle that illegitimate children
may take only when there are no legitimates who can.
Another class of cases is where both can take under a will. For ex-
ample, where the number is specified, as where a testator, having four
children, two of each kind, gives to his four children then living. Re
Humphries,.24 Ch. D. 691 (Eng. 1883). Or where the children are referred
to by name. Hartley v. Tribber, 16 Beav. 5io (Eng. 1853).
RECENT CASES
In this country when the illegitimate child is not that of the testator
there is a conflict of opinion as to the subject of legitimation by the subse-
quent marriage of its parents, as bringing it within the scope of the word
children. This conflict is probably due more to the variation in the lan-
guage of the statutes than to anything else. The following decisions have
enabled the child to take: Smith v. Lansing, 24 Misc. Rep. 566 (N. Y. i898);
Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254 (igoo); Morton's Estate v. Morton, 62 Neb. 42o
(igoi). Contra, Hicks v. Smith, 94 Ga. 8o (1895).
WILLs-LFE EsTAT WITH POWER TO CoNsumE--After granting his real
estate to his wife in fee and providing for certain legacies, the testator be-
queathed all the residue of his estate to his wife "for her sole use, benefit and
support during her natural life and to be in her sole control and direction,"
all remaining after her death to go to the heirs of his deceased brothers
and sisters. An heir of a deceased brother of the testator presented a peti-
tion to restrain the widow from giving away portions of the estate to her
relatives. Held: The widow did not take the property absolutely. While
she could appropriate or dispose of it all if necessary for her own support,
she could not apply any part of it to any other purpose. Watson's Estate,
241 Pa. 271 (1913).
A bequest of personalty with power to consume is presumed to carry
with it an absolute title, and the provision that the property is for the
devisee's "own use and benefit" does not limit to a life estate if no disposi-
tion is made of the remainder. In re Barrett's Will, III Ia. 570 (Ioo).
But this presumption is not conclusive and may be overthrown by any evi-
dence showing a contrary intent on the part of the testator. The question is
always one of intent. Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218 (i899). And where there
is a gift over of the unconsumed part on the death of the first taker, the
devisee is allowed to use the property for his own support alone. Watson's
Estate, supra.
In case the gift is absolute, the testator cannot, by a subsequent clause
in his will, restrict the devisee's power of disposition of the property. Levy's
Estate, 153 Pa. 174 (1893), where an attempt was made to restrain the widow
from disposing by will of what remained at her death. But if an absolute
interest is given and the testator afterwards unequivocally shows his intention
for the donee to take a less estate, the prior gift will be so restricted, Sheets'
Estate, 52 Pa. 257 (1866). Words of desire or recommendation for future
disposal of the property by the devisee do not affect his interest and receive
no legal cognizance, Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. 268 (1853). They are con-
sidered merely precatory unless used to express the intention and will of
the testator. In the latter case, however, they are mandatory and will be
enforced by the law. Dickinson's Estate, 2og Pa. 59 (1904). For distinction
between mandatory and precatory words, see page 399, of this issue.
WILLS-SPECIFIC AND DEMONSTRATIVE LEGACIEs-A testator gave a dwell-
ing house to be sold and, equally divided between two legatees; a later
codicil stated that the land had been sold and the proceeds vested in two
other houses. Held: The gift was a specific and not a demonstrative legacy,
and therefore adeemed by the sale of the house. May v. Stewards Legatees,
79 S. E. Rep. 1o26 (Va. 1913).
A specific legacy is a bequest of a particular thing distinguished from
all others of the same kind and which can only be satisfied by delivery of
the particular thing. 3 Pom. Eq. Juris., §1130 (3rd Ed.); Ashburner v.
Macguire, 2 Brown Ch. io8 (Eng. 1786); Maybury v. Grady, 67 Ala. 147
(188o) ; Dauel v. Arnold, 201 Ill. 570 (19o3); Wethered v. Baltimore Safe
Dep., 79 Md. 153 (1894); Starbuck v. Starbuck, 93 N. C. 183 (1885). A
devise of land is always specific. Forrester v. Lord Leigh, Amb. 171 (Eng.
1752); Conn. Land Trust Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683 (19o3); Corrigan v.
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Reid, 40 II. App. 404 (i89o); In re Sprague's Est., 125 Mich. 357 (Igoo);
Hoffman v. Steubing, 49 Misc. Rep. .57 (N. Y. 19o6); In re Pitman's Est.,
182 Pa. (1897). Also a devise of the proceeds is specific. Page v. Leafing-
well, i8 Ves. Jr. 463 (Eng. 1812); In re Martin, 25 R. L. 1 (19o3); King
v. Sheffey, 8 Leigh, 6r4 (Va. 1837). But a bequest of a sum payable prim-
arily out of a particular fund or property is demonstrative. Hutchinson v.
Fuller, 75 Ga. 88 (1885) ; I's re Stilphen, 1o Me. 146 (i9o5) ; Merrirnan v.
Merriman, go Minn. 254 (ipoo) ; Johnson v. Conover, 54 N. J. Eq. 333 iWg6);
White v. White, 73 S. C. 261 (i9o6).
